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1 Introduction
The Tax Court, sitting in Cape Town, recently had occasion to
consider the deductibility of royalty payments.1 In general it may be said
that royalties are payments for the use of another’s intellectual property,
such as patents or trade marks. As such, royalty payments are made on a
daily basis in the commercial world. It has always been widely accepted
that royalty payments are deductible from income in terms of the general
deduction formula2 and taxpayers have for years claimed this deduction
without objection from the South African Revenue Service. In the case
under discussion, the Commissioner for the South African Revenue
Service (the ‘‘Commissioner’’) successfully challenged this accepted view
regarding the deductibility of royalties, the court finding that the
payments were of a capital nature and therefore not deductible.
2 The Facts
The taxpayer manufactures supplies and markets certain products in
South Africa. Together with a number of other companies, the taxpayer
dominates the market in South Africa. Each of these companies conducts
its operations under a brand name, which it either owns or is licensed to
use. In terms of the taxpayer’s memorandum it is obliged to use a certain
corporate name by permission of its holding company with the
stipulation that on withdrawal of such permission, it would cease to
use this name or trade mark.
The taxpayer’s holding company, which is incorporated in England
and Wales, is the owner of the trade mark and other licensed marking
indicia (collectively referred to as the trade mark) used by the taxpayer.
Until 1997, the taxpayer used this trade mark free of charge. In 1997 an
agreement was entered into between the taxpayer and its holding
company in terms of which the taxpayer obtained the non-exclusive and
non-assignable authorisation to use this trade mark, whilst the holding
* I would like to thank Chemus Taljaard and Pieter Oosthuizen for reading an earlier draft of this paper.
1 Case no 11454.
2 Emslie, Davis, Hutton & Oliver Cases and Materials 350; De Koker Silke on South African Income Tax
(2005) par 7.25.
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company remained the owner of the trade marks. The agreement would
subsist for a period of two years, whereafter it would be renewed
automatically for succeeding twelve-month periods, unless either of the
parties terminated the agreement by giving six months’ notice to the
other, or by reason of some breach, as set out in the agreement. If the
agreement were to be terminated, the taxpayer would no longer be able
use the trade mark. In return for the use of the trade mark, the taxpayer
was to pay an annual royalty fee to the holding company. The fee was
calculated as a rate per measure of product sold. During the 1997, 1998
and 1999 years of assessment, the taxpayer sought to deduct these royalty
payments in terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act (‘‘the Act’’) in
calculating its taxable income. After the Commissioner refused the
deduction, the taxpayer appealed to the Tax court.
3 The Law
Section 11(a), read with section 23(g) of the Act, allows the deduction
of expenditure or losses actually incurred in the production of income,
provided that the expenditure or losses are not of a capital nature. The
deduction will be allowed only to the extent to which moneys are laid out
or expended for the purposes of trade. In issue in the present case was
whether the expenditure in question, that is, the payment of royalties, was
of a capital nature. If found to be of a capital nature, these expenses
would not be deductible in terms of the relevant section.
In order to determine whether expenditure is of a capital nature or not,
the true nature of each transaction must be examined. If the expenditure
incurred should properly be regarded as part of the cost of performing the
income-earning operations of the taxpayer, it is of a revenue nature. If, on
the other hand, the expenditure incurred should properly be regarded as
part of the cost of establishing or improving or adding to the income-
earning plant ormachinery, it is of a capital nature.3 Put differently, money
spent on creating or acquiring a source of profit is capital expenditure,
whilst money spent working that source is of a revenue nature.4
Two subsidiary tests have been developed by the courts to assist in
determining whether expenditure is of a capital or revenue nature.5 The
first is the so-called ‘‘enduring benefit test’’ which Lord Cave, in British
Insulated Helsby Cables v Atherton,6 formulated as follows:
‘‘But where an expenditure is made, not only once and for all, but with a view to bringing into
existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, I think that there is very
good reason (in the absence of special circumstances leading to an opposite conclusion) for
treating such an expenditure as properly attributable not to revenue but to capital.’’
3 New State Areas Ltd v CIR 1946 AD 621.
4 CIR v George Forest Timber 1924 AD 526.
5 According to Emslie et al Income Tax Cases and Materials 350, if the test set forth in the New State
Areas case provides a clear answer, there is no need to apply the other two tests. It is only when the
first-mentioned test is equivocal that the subsidiary tests are applied.
6 1926 AC 205.
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This test has been applied by our courts many times.7 It has been
pointed out that the word ‘‘enduring’’ does not mean ‘‘interminable or
even for the whole of the duration of the business of the company’’.
Depending on the nature of the enterprise and of the benefit, a lesser
degree of permanence is sufficient.8 Criticism against the enduring benefit
test is that no certainty exists as to the length of the time which is needed
in respect of each asset or advantage, in order for it to be regarded as
‘‘enduring’’.9 It may therefore be difficult to apply the enduring benefit
test, as one would never be sure when a court will regard an asset or
benefit as enduring.
The second of the subsidiary tests is the ‘‘once-and-for-all test’’.
According to this test, if a payment is made once and for all, it is a capital
expenditure, whilst recurrent expenditure is of a revenue nature. This test
has, however, been described as:
‘‘[O]f little value in those cases where capital expenditure is given the appearance of revenue
expenditure because it is paid in instalments and where revenue expenditure is given the
appearance of capital expenditure because it is commuted and paid in one lump sum.’’10
This test is therefore also of limited practical value because of the fact
that the frequency of payments may be controlled or even manipulated
by the parties to the transaction.
4 The Judgment
4 1 The taxpayer’s arguments
On behalf of the taxpayer it was argued that the holding company, and
not the taxpayer, was the owner of the trade mark, that the taxpayer
obtained no enduring benefit, as the contract could be terminated on six
months’ notice and that the royalty payments were recurrent annually.
For these reasons, the taxpayer argued, the royalty fees were not of a
capital nature and therefore deductible.
In order to support the point that the payment was of a revenue nature,
counsel for the taxpayer drew an analogy between the royalty payments
made by the taxpayer and rental payable by a tenant to a landlord. Like
the rental, the royalty was payment for the use of another’s asset. The
court rejected this analogy on the basis that the nature and effect of the
asset, the use of which was being paid for, differed on two material
points. First, so the court reasoned, the taxpayer would be unable to
trade without the trade mark. The court rejected the notion that the trade
mark was comparable with a good trade location in the context of the
landlord and tenant analogy, on the basis that a single location is not
necessary for the success of a business. Secondly, a characteristic of a
7 Eg Palabora Mining Co Ltd v SIR 1973 3 SA 819 (A); CIR v African Oxygen Ltd 1963 1 SA 681 (A).
8 CIR v African Oxygen Ltd supra 689.
9 Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd v COT 1962 1 SA 381 (FC) 388.
10 New State Areas Ltd v CIR supra 622.
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trade mark is that it is distinctive. This is not so in the case of a fixed asset
which is being leased. The trade mark gives identity to the user thereof
and carries with it the reputation associated with the product, whilst a
leased premises does not give identity to its lessee, nor does it carry any
reputation with it. The court came to the conclusion that, in the present
case, the taxpayer derived its structure and goodwill from the trade mark
and would be unable to continue its business without the trade mark. The
court held that in the case of the lease of a building, the taxpayer would
be able to move to another building without its structure or goodwill
being affected.
In assessing the court’s argument, one should ask whether the
differences between the nature of a trade mark and fixed property
referred to by the court are sufficient to reject such an analogy. In cases
relating to other branches of the law, our courts have found the analogy
between rental and royalties helpful and have not been concerned about
perceived differences.11 It is submitted that, in the final instance, in the
case of rental and the royalty fee, payment is being made as consideration
for the use of another’s asset. The fact that these assets may differ in
certain respects does not seem relevant when the deductibility of payment
for its use is considered.
Albeit in a different context, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Cactus
Investments (Pty) Ltd v CIR,12 pointed out limitations in the analogy
between rental payable for the use of an asset and interest paid on money
borrowed. In that case, the court refused to regard interest paid by a
borrower to a lender as payment for the use of money, because in the
Cactus case, the court dealt with loans for consumption in which the
borrower becomes the owner of the money. The court therefore based its
rejection on the fact that in the case of a loan for consumption, ownership
in the capital sum passed from lender to borrower and, consequently,
that no continuing obligation rested on the lender. In the case of a lease,
ownership of the asset does not pass and the lessor has the obligation to
make the asset available, as well as other continuing obligations.
Returning to the present case and the analogy between rental and
royalties, the court seems to have accepted that in both instances the
lessor or trade mark proprietor remains the owner of the asset. The court
therefore does not distinguish the rental and royalty payments on the
same basis as the distinction between rental and interest as set out in the
Cactus case. The court’s argument seems to be based solely on the
difference in the nature of the asset. It is submitted that this
differentiation is not sufficient to reject the analogy, as in both instances
payment is made for the use of another’s asset.
Furthermore, while the court’s argument that a good trading location
11 In African Gold Recovery Co v Crowns Reef Gold Mining Co 1899 6 Official Reports 84, it was stated ‘‘I
will admit that the relations of licensor and licensee are similar to those of lessor and lessee’’. See also
Wistyn Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Levi Strauss & Co 1986 4 SA 796 (T).
12 1999 1 SA 315 (SCA).
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is not indispensable to the success of the business and that a business may
be moved to a different building, might be true in the present case, it
certainly is not true in general. Very often trade location is of paramount
importance to a business and a move to a different location might render
it unable to continue its operations. A specific location may, therefore, in
particular circumstances, have goodwill attached to it.13
Even if it is accepted that a business could continue unaffected in a
different location, it must surely follow that relocation of the business will
involve significant costs. The court accepts that the use of the trade mark
in this instance meant that the taxpayer did not have to incur the very
significant costs of re-branding itself and its product. Would re-branding
and relocating not involve similar costs and disruptions and necessitate
adaptations by a business?
In conclusion, it is submitted that the analogy between rental and
royalties has merit and serves as a useful aid in determining whether the
royalty payments were of a capital nature. The writer is of the view that
the court was wrong in rejecting the analogy.
4 2 Arguments on behalf of the Commissioner
On the authority of the well known and often quoted passage in CIR v
Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd,14 it was argued on behalf of the Commissioner that
the closeness of the connection between the expenditure and the income-
earning operations had to be assessed, having regard to both the purpose
of the expenditure and what it actually affects. The court held that an
overly technical classification of a right or benefit should not be followed
in determining the nature thereof. A practical and business point of view
should rather be taken and, in the present case, this meant that the nature
of the advantage sought by the taxpayer is determined by the following
factors: most of the taxpayer’s competitors operate under well-
established international brand names and marks; the trade mark was
well established in the South African market and use thereof would
enable the taxpayer to differentiate its products from those of its
competitors; to avoid the costs of re-branding itself; to enable the
taxpayer to take advantage of the reputation of the trade mark in South
Africa; to enhance customer loyalty and increase sales and increase
market share.
In support of its finding that a practical and business point of view
should be followed, the court quotes from an Australian source. It is
interesting that the court felt the need to refer to Australian authority,
simply to make this point. Rather, one would have expected the court to
refer to the test formulated by the Australian courts in determining the
13 Rosenbach & Co (Pty) Ltd v Dalmonte 1964 2 SA 209; Receiver of Revenue (Cape) v Cavanagh 1912
AD 464.
14 1955 3 SA 293 (A).
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difference between expenditure of a capital and revenue nature15 in
support of its finding on the merits of the case. The test used in Australia
certainly corresponds closely to the predominant test used in South
African courts16 and guidance on the issue of the deductibility of royalties
may be sought from their precedents.17
The court did, however, find it necessary to quote from the heads of
argument of counsel in SIR v Cadac Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd.18 It is
interesting to note that the court does not acknowledge that the passage
quoted comes from the heads of argument, nor does it state whether it
agrees with this argument or not. The quotation is merely presented as
authority for the view that expenditure which is intended to produce
income is not for that reason alone categorised as revenue expenditure.
In an argument which is hard to follow, the Commissioner made the
point that the taxpayer needed the license to use the trade mark before it
could operate its business and that, consequently, the taxpayer was
obtaining a source of income, rather than incurring expenditure in
working that source. The court dismissed this argument by simply stating
that the taxpayer did not require the trade marks to operate its business,
because it was already in operation. The agreement was entered into by
the taxpayer with its holding company in order to retain and build the
business it already operated.19
On the strength of Rand Mines (Mining & Services) Ltd v CIR,20 the
Commissioner further argued that the agreement between the taxpayer
and its holding company did not in itself produce income, but that it
created an opportunity for the taxpayer to earn income. Consequently, so
the argument went, the expenditure was of a capital nature. In the Rand
Mines case, the taxpayer’s business was to manage and administer mines
in the Rand Mines group. An amount paid by the taxpayer to another
company as compensation for the cancellation of that company’s
contract to manage a mine which the Rand Mines group had recently
acquired, was disallowed as a deduction. The court held that Rand Mines
did not hold the management contracts as its stock-in-trade. Its stock-in-
trade was the provision of management services. The fact that the
taxpayer’s parent company determined when management contracts
would be acquired or disposed of played an important role in the court’s
decision. The management agreements were seen as an opportunity to
15 Eg in Sun Newspapers Ltd v The Federal Commissioner of Taxation 1938 61 CLR 337.
16 See par 3 supra.
17 Eg Cliffs International Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 1979 HCA 8, 1979 142 CLR 140, in
which it was found that a royalty payment was of a revenue nature and therefore deductible.
18 1965 2 SA 511 (A).
19 The court’s findings in this regard should be contrasted to its findings later in the same judgment
where it held in par 44, that ‘‘[t]his expenditure is akin to expenditure incurred in setting up a business’’
and later again, in par 63, that the payments in issue were ‘‘in substance a purchase price for a
business’’.
20 1997 1 SA 427 (A).
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earn income by providing management services and therefore they
constituted part of the taxpayer’s income earning structure.
In the present case, the court found some merit in the Commissioner’s
argument that the agreement between the taxpayer and its holding
company could be likened to the mine managing contracts in the Rand
Mines case. The court held that the agreement between the taxpayer and
its holding company for the use of the trade mark was a ‘‘vital
component’’ of its business, without which its ‘‘business or trading
prospects are limited’’. The court also agreed with the Commissioner’s
submission that the royalty payments were akin to payments made for
the acquisition in terms of a franchise agreement.
It is submitted that the Rand Mines case may be distinguished from the
present one in a number of ways. First, in the Rand Mines case, the
management contracts themselves, which obliged Rand Mines to render
such management services, were the source of income. In the present case,
the trade mark itself did not generate any income: it was one of a number
of things used by the taxpayer to generate its income form manufacturing
and selling certain products. Secondly, in the Rand Mines case, the
taxpayer did not usually pay for the cancellation of a management
contract. The payment also constituted a substantial and once-off
amount. In the present case, the taxpayer and its holding company agreed
on a market-related rate for the calculation of the royalty and that
amount was payable annually, and therefore recurrently, by the taxpayer
to its holding company. Nowhere was it argued that these payments were
unusual or even substantial in comparison with the taxpayer’s business.
Thirdly, in the Rand Mines case, the taxpayer acquired an asset of a
capital nature, namely the management contract which allowed it to
render certain services. In the present case the trade mark constituted the
asset. The taxpayer never acquired the asset, it merely paid a royalty for
the use of the asset.
This point may be illustrated by returning to the analogy of a lease
agreement. The court in the Rand Mines case compared21 the acquisition
of the management contracts to a situation where a landlord purchases
from another landlord the latter’s leases, not with a view to their resale,
but with a view to acquiring rents payable in terms of these leases. In such
a situation the court was of the view that the expenditure incurred by the
landlord would be of a capital nature. As stated above, the comparison
between the royalty payment in the present case and rental paid to a
landlord entails that in both cases payment is made for the use of an
asset; in the case of rental, it is for the use of fixed property, in the case of
the royalty, it is for the use of a trade mark. In the Rand Mines case, the
taxpayer paid to acquire a capital asset, namely the management
21 The court made it clear that the comparison was not entirely valid, but truer than the taxpayer’s
argument that expenses incurred by a landlord in connection with leases are comparable with the
payment for the management agreement.
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contract, similar to a situation in which a landlord pays for the
acquisition of other leases. In the case of the royalty payments, the
taxpayer did not pay its holding company for the acquisition of the trade
mark. It paid to use the trade mark. Lastly, in the present case, the court
regarded the royalty payment as akin to a payment in terms of a franchise
agreement which the court held to be of a capital nature. No authority is
provided for the court’s decision on this score. However, in the Rand
Mines case, the court likened the management contracts to franchise
agreements, the cost of acquisition of which was not regarded as revenue
expenditure. The court in the Rand Mines case referred to ITC 106322 in
which it was held that payment to a manufacturer of gramophone records
for a sole right of distribution was expenditure of a capital nature. What
is interesting to note, however, is that in the ITC 1063 case, the court
specifically found that the payments were not royalties.23 The payment in
that case was for the purpose of buying a franchise and, although it was
paid in three pre-determined instalments, it could be regarded as a lump-
sum payment. It should also be noted that in the Rand Mines case the
court held that the cost of the acquisition of a franchise agreement is of a
capital nature. One would therefore be able to argue that the Rand Mines
and ITC 1063 cases are authority for the view that a once-off payment to
acquire a franchise is of a capital nature.
It is, however, not authority for the view that royalty payments made
to the proprietor of a trade mark is of a capital nature. The court in the
present case seems to have confused these points as it found that the
royalty payments were
‘‘in substance a purchase price for a business which gave a substantial market share in the
defined area, similar to a franchise agreement. The payments made to obtain these rights must
therefore by its very nature be a capital expense’’ (own emphasis).24
Clearly the royalty payments were payments for the use of the trade
mark. The taxpayer never acquired or purchased the trade mark.
In CIR v African Oxygen Ltd,25 the taxpayer agreed with a competitor
to form a third company, the losses of which the taxpayer undertook to
make good in exchange for, inter alia, the competitor agreeing not to
compete with the taxpayer. The court held that the enforceable right
which the taxpayer had to prevent its competitor from competing with it
was, in itself, an actual asset. This asset was of a sufficiently enduring
nature and, in the absence of a close link between the income-earning
operation and the expenditure, this expenditure was held to be of a
capital nature. With reference to the above case, the court in the present
matter reasoned that the right to use the trade mark is in itself a capital
asset.
22 27 SATC 57 (N).
23 Supra 58.
24 Case no 11454 par 63.
25 1963 1 SA 681 (A).
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It could be argued that the right to prevent someone from competing
with a business, which the court in the African Oxygen case found to be
of a capital nature, is not similar to the right to use a trade mark. Costs
spent on eliminating the competition, whether by way of a right to
prevent a competitor from trading26 or by buying out the competitor,27
are of a capital nature. However, costs spent on paying for the right to
use another’s asset (although that right may in itself be an asset) should
be regarded as being of a revenue nature. This may be explained by
returning, once again, to the analogy between rent and royalty. Even
though a rental agreement (that is, the right to occupy a premises) may
under certain circumstances be regarded as a capital asset in the hands of
a lessee,28 payment of the rental to the landlord is regarded as of a
revenue nature. The point is fortified by bearing in mind that, in the
present case, the agreement entailed non-exclusive authorisation to use
the trade mark. All the taxpayer received was the right to use the trade
mark. The taxpayer’s competition was not eliminated29 and, because this
authorisation was non-exclusive, the holding company could, if it so
wished, authorise any other person to trade in South Africa under the
same trade mark.
Next the Commissioner argued that the taxpayer obtained an enduring
benefit by entering into the agreement with its holding company.
Although the agreement would initially only subsist for a period of two
years and thereafter be automatically renewed annually, unless one party
gave the other six months’ notice, the court found that the taxpayer had
acquired an enduring benefit. As stated earlier,30 the problem with the
enduring benefit test is determining the period for which a benefit should
subsist in order for it to be ‘‘enduring’’. In Nchanga Consolidated Copper
Mines Ltd v COT,31 the court held that an advantage of one year was not
an ‘‘enduring benefit’’. In the Palabora Mining32 case it was found that
the supply of water eight months earlier was a short-lived advantage, and
therefore not of an enduring benefit. In the African Oxygen33 case an
agreement for a period of seven years was found to be an enduring
benefit. A contract enduring for 20 years was held in the Rand Mines34
case to provide an enduring benefit. In the ITC 106335 case a right
granted for three years, with a right of renewal for a further two years,
26 CIR v African Oxygen Ltd supra.
27 Cadac Engineering Works supra.
28 ITC 175 5 SATC 180; SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax par 24.3 where SARS
seem to acknowledge that an amount paid to a lessee for the termination of a lease is of a capital
nature.
29 The court acknowledges this by stating repeatedly that the taxpayer needed the trade mark because its
competitors used international brand names.
30 Par 3 supra.
31 Supra 390-391.
32 Supra 833.
33 Supra 689.
34 Supra 435.
35 Supra 59.
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was found to be ‘‘a substantial period’’ and to constitute an enduring
benefit. The correctness of the court’s inference in the present case that a
contract, initially for two years and thereafter renewable annually unless
the required notice was given, is an enduring benefit, is, in the light of the
case law cited above, open to doubt.36
The court found that the fact that the payments were labeled as
royalties was irrelevant in determining whether it was of a capital nature
or not. The court also deemed irrelevant to this inquiry the manner of
calculating the amount to be paid, namely as a percentage of volume
sold, also the fact that the payment was recurrent, as was the point that
the taxpayer was not the owner of the trade mark.
The court concluded that the expenditure incurred was to protect and
increase the taxpayer’s market share and reputation. Consequently, the
court held that the expenses related to the taxpayer’s income earning
structure rather than to its income earning operations and were thus of a
capital nature.
5 Applying the Law to the Facts
If one applies the tests to distinguish between revenue and capital
expenditure as laid down by the courts37 to the facts of the present case, a
different conclusion may be reached than the one arrived at by the court.
Payments for the right to use another’s trade mark (even if the trade
mark is a very important part of one’s business) is part of the costs of
performing the taxpayer’s income-earning operations. Such payments
cannot be regarded as part of the cost of creating an income-earning
structure. It is submitted that, in coming to its conclusion, the court
attributed insufficient weight to the fact that the taxpayer was not the
owner of the trade mark and that it merely paid for the use of the trade
mark. In the New State Areas38case, the court ruled that an annual
redemption payment to the Town Council in respect of sewers located on
the mine’s property, which consequently had become the mine’s property,
was of a capital nature and consequently not deductible. A similar
payment, in respect of sewers located off the mine’s property, was held to
be of a revenue nature. The court was of the view that the mine had
acquired no asset and that, consequently, the payment was made for the
use of the Town Council’s sewers. In the Palabora Mining case, the loss
incurred by the taxpayer in constructing waterworks on another’s
property to enable the taxpayer to receive water earlier than would
otherwise have been the case, was regarded as revenue in nature. In that
case the taxpayer was not the owner of the waterworks and the court held
that such loss never created an asset for the taxpayer. The court held that
36 Cf Du Plessis ‘‘Annual Royalty Payments Held to be Non-deductible’’ March 2006 De Rebus
www.derebus.org.za [11.05.06].
37 Par 3 supra.
38 Supra 627-628.
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the fact that no asset was acquired as a result of the expenditure was
always a relevant factor to be taken into account when determining
whether expenditure was of a capital or revenue nature. In the present
case, the taxpayer was not the owner of the trade mark and merely paid a
royalty for the use of such trade mark.
In the Palabora Mining case, the court regarded as a cardinal feature of
the case the fact that no asset was created in the hands of the taxpayer,
together with the fact that the taxpayer’s objective with the expenditure
was to accelerate the supply of water to the taxpayer. The accelerated
supply of water was found by the court not to be an enduring benefit. In
other words, although the fact that the taxpayer was not the owner of the
asset was an important factor taken into account by the court, this was
not decisive. However, coupled with the fact that the taxpayer received
no enduring benefit, the court was persuaded that the expenditure was of
a revenue nature and therefore deductible.
If this reasoning is applied to the present case, it is clear that the
royalty payments should similarly be regarded as revenue in nature. The
taxpayer never became the owner of the trade mark and, as argued
above, the agreement between the taxpayer and its holding company for
the use of the trade mark did not constitute an enduring benefit.
6 Implications of the Judgment
The judgment certainly has implications, not only for payment of
royalties on trade marks, but also for royalties on other forms of
intellectual property, such as patented inventions or copyright works like
computer programs.
The court’s finding seems to imply that, if a taxpayer relies solely on
one item of intellectual property, which is of crucial importance to the
taxpayer’s business and determines its identity, the royalties payable in
respect thereof will not be deductible. It has been suggested that if the
taxpayer relies on more than one trade mark or produces numerous
products subject to several licensing agreements, that the judgment will
not apply, and that, accordingly, the royalties paid will be deductible.39 If
this is correct, the question arises as to why a taxpayer who uses only one
trade mark should be penalised with non-deductibility, whereas a
taxpayer using multiple trade marks is allowed deductions. This point
reinforces the view that payment for the use of an asset is not part of the
cost of establishing, improving or adding to the income-earning structure.
In other words, paying for the use of a trade mark does not make that
trade mark part of the taxpayer’s structure. This holds true, whether the
taxpayer uses one trade mark or many, and even if the trade mark(s)
is(are) very important to the taxpayer’s business.
39 Lessing & Wellsted ‘‘Recent Tax Developments’’ 2005 Tax Works vol 22 2-3.
200 STELL LR 2006 1
7 Conclusion
It is widely accepted that royalty payments are of a revenue nature and
therefore deductible.40 The court’s judgment that the royalty payments
are of a capital nature is based on its failure to regard the royalty as
payment for the use of another’s asset. In this regard, the analogy
between royalties and rental paid by a tenant to a landlord would have
served as a useful guide in determining the nature of the payment.
Furthermore, the case law cited supports the view that in the present case
the agreement between the taxpayer and its holding company was not an
enduring benefit and should therefore be deductible. This, coupled with
the fact that the taxpayer was not the owner of the trade mark, shows
that such royalty payment is of a revenue nature and should therefore be
deductible.
OPSOMMING
Hierdie artikel bespreek die onlangse beslissing van die Kaapse Belastinghof waarin bevind is
dat die betaling van ’n tantie`me vir die gebruik van ’n handelsmerk en ander simbole nie
aftrekbaar is ten einde ’n belastingbetaler se belasbare inkomste te bereken nie. Die hof se
beslissing dat hierdie tantie`me van ’n kapitale aard is word ontleed en gemeet aan die regsbeginsels
neergeleˆ deur die howe om te bepaal of ’n uitgawe van ’n kapitale aard is al dan nie. Die
gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat die beslissing nie korrek is nie.
40 Par 1 supra.
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